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or fills in or otherwise 
or the street or sidmvalk in front of or 
or constructs any area, or room, 
or makes any in connection there-
with, has a lien upon "uch lot for work 
furnished, notice of which 
for in se<:tioll 1187 nmst 
after the 
this section was amended as '' person 
11t the of the owner any lot or tract land 
fills or otherwise 
or sidewalk in front 
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' the same, ... has lien upon ~ said lot 
of land for his work done and materials furnished; 
that in cases where the made or work 
done 1'.s snbject to acceptance by any municipal boarcl or officer, 
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and section 1193.1 
, section 1193.1 was 
which that if 
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towns and that the additional 
for 
offieer or 
until after acceptance of 
where such 
mean other than or boards, 
withiu the term. Plaintiffs argue, that the word "mu-
nicipal" is a word which should be given a 
c·onstruction. These appear to be meritorious. 
[1] It has been held that where an amendment to a statute 
consists of a deletion of an express the presumption 
in the law was intended 
55 P.2d 81]; 
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P. 52 A.I.~.R. 
; Loe1v's Inc. v. Bryam., 11 Cal.2d 746, 750 P.2d 1] ). 
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Plaintiffs also argue second 1951 amendment to 
the section § ) , ''If a work of 
ment is of the cl1araeter to in Section 1184.1 of this 
code and is to or govern-
mental the of improvement 
shall be deemed to be the " (emphasis 
confirmation of the legislative 
from include all claims of lien for 
road work within the scope of the the 
time for claims on work to public 
whether within or outside of the limits of incor-
porated towns and cities. In Gadd v. 69 Cal.App. 
. T. H. BECHTEL Co. C.2d 
, the court said: ''Whenever it appears 
ccoLn.ucu.. the terms 'municipality' and 
will be construed to include a county 
p. 118; 
Cal. 329 
P. ; Union Stone Co. v. Board 71 N..J.Eq. 
re, since 1Dl:1 at least, 
' as used in the title to 
()57 I (if) ~\. 46(i] .) That 
intended that the word ' 
the Street Bond Act of should be em-
in its larger sense, so as to include counties as well as 
eities and towns, is made manifest the fact that in a new 
added to the act in 1913 ( Stats. 1913, p. 351), it is 
expressly declared that the work provided for by the Street 
Improvement Bond Act may be performed in 'unincorporated 
of counties,' and that wherever the words 'munici-
pality,' 'municipalities,' or 'eity' appear in the act, 'they 
shall be and are defined as including cities, cities and 
counties and counties, and are hereby expressly declared to 
be interchangeable \Vith any or either of those terms.' '' 
In Villanaztll v. City of Los Angeles, 37 CaL2d 718 [235 
P.2d 16], the question raised was whether the city, county or 
state was liable for the alleged negligence of one Gregg who 
was a deputy marshal of the Municipal Court of the City of 
Los Angeles. \Y e held ( p. 724) that ". . . the character of a 
municipal court is not affected nor is its nature determined in 
an:v ·way the requirement that the city must assent to its 
establishn1ent. 'rhe fundamental basis of the court, as fixed 
by the Constitution and statutes, indicates that essentially it 
is a creature the county." (Emphasis added.) In Pacific 
Coast Ry. Co. v. Pm·ter, 74 CaL 261, 262 P. 774], it was 
helrl that " ... the word 'municipal,' as used in the provision 
L ~ 14 J, refers to such corporations as are for public 
government, and therefore includes counties.'' In Beclter 
Y. City of Albany, 47 CaLApp.2d 702 [118 P.2d 924], it was 
helrl that nwmbers of a board of education were municipal 
ofilcer:s: in Rock Creek etc. Dist. v. County of Calaveras, 29 
CaL2d 7, 11 [172 P.2d 863], we " No violenee is done 
to the rules of construction under the interpretation of the 
i erm "municipal corporations" here contended for. It is 
eommon knowledge that in popular usage the term "municipal 
eorporation'' is understood as applying to all departments of 
state org·anization exercising public functions, and the same 
general use of the term is common in judicial decisions and 
with law text-writers. . '" In In re Werner, 129 CaL 
.July 1954] CLEMENTS v. T. R. BECHTEL Co. 
[43 C.2d 227; 273 P.2d 5] 
567, 573 P. 97], this court said "In a 
say that all law other than international law is ·molt.·w,,,,.,m,. 
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but when we speak of corporations as municipal we mean 
cities or towns." (Emphasis added.) People v. 30 
CaL 98, 99, holds that "municipal" means an inferior power 
or jurisdiction rather than state and the court 
refused to interpret " fine" to mean "state fine." 
In support of position that the "munici· 
pal officer'' is broad enough to include a county officer, various 
constitutional provisions are cited not as in point, but 
to show that the word "municipal" often includes a county. 
For example, article XI, section 18, is entitled "Municipal 
Debt Incurred in Any Year not to Exceed Income-Excep-
tions." (Emphasis added.) The section commences with this 
sentence: "No connty, town, township, board of educa-
tion, or school district, shall incur any indebtedness or lia-
bility .... ' (Emphasis added. 
[10] Por the foregoing reasons, it appears that the words 
"any municipal board or officer" are sufficiently broad and 
were intended by the Legislature to include an officer or board 
of a county and that the defendants' demurrer on the ground 
that the time limited had run was improperly sustained. 
THE PLEADINGS 
Defendants also demurred on the ground that the complaint 
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action 
against them and that it was uncertain in specified particulars. 
Defendants also moved to strike certain portions* of plain-
tiffs' complaint which motion was granted by the trial court. 
Plaintiffs, after alleging their own licensed status, etc. 
alleged : ''That in March, 1950, JOHN A. RAGGHIANTI and 
H.osE RAGGHIAN'TI were the owners of a portion of the Rancho 
San Miguel in Contra Costa County, California, and sub-
divided said portion into 220 lots as delineated and so desig-
nated on the subdiyision map thereof, which said map was 
entitled 'Tree Haven, Contra-Costa County, California,' and 
which map was filed in the office of the Recorder of said 
Contra Costa County on March 31, 1950, in Volume 39 of 
Maps, at page 40; that the real property upon which a lien 
is claimed and which is sought to be impressed with a lien is 
all of the real property within the exterior boundary lines 
shown and designated on said map." Following this is an 
allegation that John A. Ragghianti and Rose Ragghianti sold 
*The portions so stri<,kcn are those which appear between brackets. 
special 
the said 
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] ,988.00 
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work and labor per-
with a of 
with said lien suffi-
""""'·"""'"~r herein before 
and recording 
of which has 
[11] Defendants' demmrer on the of'"""''"''"" 
and was not weH taken in that 
it can be ascertained from the what the plaintiffs' 
demands were, the credits and offsets to be deducted therefrom, 
the names of the owners, or owners of the the 
character of the work and labor and ma-
tt'rials the name of the persons for whom, and at 
whose the work was done and materials furnished. 
Section 1187 of Civil that certain 
CLEMENTs v. T. R. BECHTEL Co. C.2d 
persons may file for within a certain time limitation, 
with the recorder of the "in which such prop-
thereof is situated a claim of lien containing 
of his demand after deducting all just credits 
the name of the owner or reputed owner, if 
statement of the kind of work done or ma-
terials him, or both, the name of the person 
or whom he furnished the rna-
and a of the to be charged 
with the lien sufficient for identification; which claim of lien 
must be verified by oath of claimant or some other person.'' 
[12] A complaint to foreclose a mechanic's lien must show 
a substantial compliance with the statute as to the contents 
and of the notice of lien (Barilari v. Ferrea, 59 Cal. 1; 
Goss v. Strelitz, 54 CaL 640; McCreary v. Toronto Midway 
Oil Co., 88 Cal.App. 17 [175 P. 87] .) Among other things 
it must, either by direct allegation, or by an attached copy 
of the notice of lien, show that the claim of lien contains 
the name of the owner or reputed owner of the property, if 
known, a sufficient description of the property ( Schalich 
v. Bell, 173 Cal. 773 [161 P. 983] ), and is duly verified. 
'rhe complaint must show that the claim of lien was filed 
within the prescribed period ( C oft n v. Wright, 89 Cal. 86 
[26 P. 643] ; 17 Cal.Jur. pp. 198, 194). 
Defendants demurred on the ground that the plaintiffs' 
failure to set forth the actual contents of the notice of lien 
either by its legal effect, or 1:n haec verba, constituted a total 
lack of compliance with the statutory provisions. 
The allegations contained in Paragraph XII show that 
on August 9, 195]. plaintiffs recorded a notice of lien with 
the county recorder which contained the statements required 
by section 1187 (heretofore set forth). It was also alleged 
that plaintiffs "paid for verifying and recording said notice 
of lien.'' 'While the allegation eoncerning verification could 
have been more clearly set forth, it would appear that under 
a liberal construction of the pleadings, it was sufficient. 
Defendants contend that the allegations with respect to 
the contents of the notice of lien recorded were but legal 
('Onclusions and therefore insufficient. Reliance is placed on 
Nodon v. Bedell Engineen:ng Co., 88 Cal.App. 777 [264 
P. 311], in which the court pointed out that "[t]he only 
allegations in the complaint with reference to the notice of 
lien required by law to be filed, are found in paragraph five, 
m< follows: 'That thereafter, to wit, on April 11, 1923, and 
within thirty days after the filing of notice of completion of 
July CLEMENTS v. 'f. R. BECHTEL Co. 239 
I 43 C.2d 227; 273 P.2d 5] 
said structure on said building upon which said labor and 
fixtures were furnished, and within the time 
plaintiffs caused to be filed in the office of the County Re-
eorder of r~os Angeles county, California, in book 2048, page 
] 86, of official reeords of said a mechanic's lien for 
said labor and material, and that said lien has not been re-
leased or satisfied in any way.' The failed to 
specify any of the material statements which may have been 
contained in this notice of lien, as section 1187 
of the Code of Civil Procedure. 
''Thereupon the appellants asked leave to amend their com-
plaint by adding to paragraph five, above quoted, the following 
language : 'That said mechanic's lien claim set forth that 
plaintiffs actually furnished to the defendants the labor and 
materia 1 actually used in the eollstnwtion of said building, 
and that said labor was actually done and performed, that 
said material was actually furnished, and actually entered into 
the erection and construction of said building so described.' 
~ \nd further: 'That the said lien set forth the names of the 
owners as the defendants in this action. That it further set 
forth that said owners contracted for said labor and materials 
and caused said structure to be erected. That it further set 
forth the date the said labor and material was furnished. 
That it fnrther set forth the terms, time given and conditions 
of said contract for said labor and the payment therefor. 
That it further set forth that said contract had been fully 
performed on the part of the claimants, plaintiffs in this 
aetion. That it further set forth the date on which the said 
material and labor was delivered and rendered, and when 
they cease to furnish the same. That it further set forth 
the date of the completion of said building. That it further 
set forth the exact amount due after allowing all offsets and 
credits. That it further set forth the fact that the plaintiffs 
claim the benefit of the law of the State of California relative 
to liens, mechanics' and laborers upon real property. And 
fnrther that the claim is duly verified.' '' vVhen the trial 
eourt stated to appellants' attorney that the amendment was 
still defective because the complaint could not be amended 
to state more than the lien showed, the attorney replied that 
he conceded that "the lien does not state the kind of labor or 
materials .... " 
fn the Norton ease, snpra. the court quoted the pro-
visions of section 1187 and stated that '' t will be observed 
that the original complaint failed to allege any of the fore-
in the Norton case was 
in case at bar sets forth 
the statement of demand 
the names of the owners, 
the names of the persons by 
and a sufficient description 
There is also a statement that 
for Yerification and recorda-
supra, 59 Cal. 1, to fore-
e1ose mc>chanic liens in cases were under consideration. 
The facts there Ret forth disclosed that '' complaint 
that the defendants entered into a contrart in writing 
with the of one thousand eight 
"That 
plaintiff, 
as to the Hen was as follows: 
the 22d of 
filed for record with the 
the terms of 
on the 11th 
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241 
of Alameda, that in which 
:-;aid are a elaim of lien 
ment of his demand after all 
with the names of the said owners, and said 
with a statement of the terms, time and conditions of 
plaintiff's with said 
of the said the said 
with said lien claimed by plaintiff; that said descrip-
tion vv-as sufficient for identification of said premises, said 
property and that said statement and claim were duly veri-
fi,d by the oath of plaintiff; that said claim of lien and state-
ment was duly recorded by the said County Recorder in Liber 
'C' of Mechanics' Lien, on page 281, to which lien and record 
particular reference is herein made; and the same is herein 
referrrd to and made a part hereof.'' The court held: '' 1. The 
dr>murrer was properly overruled. The averments with re-
spect to the lien are sufficient." 
Defendants' next contention is that plaintiff failed to con-
form to the requirements of section 459 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure in pleading an ordinance. That section provides 
that "[i]n pleading a private statute, or an ordinance of a 
county or municipal corporation, or a right derived there-
from, it is sufficient to refer to such statute or ordinance by 
its title and the day of its passage .... " Plaintiff's pleaded 
the ordinance by number but failed to give its title or date of 
passage. Defendants rely upon Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 
99 Cal.App.2d 105 [221 P.2d 340], Redwood Theaters, Inc. 
v. City of Modesto, 86 Cal.App.2d 907 (196 P.2d 119J, and 
Bandini Estate Co. v. Payne, 10 Cal.App.2d 623 [52 P.2d 
959], for the rule that '' [ m] ere reference to an Ordinance by 
number is not sufficient." 
[13] ·while an ordirwnee may be pleaded by the simplifierl 
method provided for in section 459 (Code of Civil Procedure), 
it may also be pleaded by setting forth the substance of the 
provision relied upon (18 CaLJur. § 211, pp. 922, 923; Amestoy 
v. Electric R. T. Co .. 95 Cal. 311 [30 P. 550); City of Tulare 
v. Het!ren, 126 Cal. 226 f5R P. 5301; Simpson v. City of Los 
Angeles, 40 Cal.2d 271 [2fl3 P.2d 464] ). This is what plain-
tiffs have done here. 
It ·would appear from the forrgoing tl1at plaintiffs stated 
a ranse of action for foreclosure of a mechanic's lien having 
eomplicd with the statutory rel)nirements therefor and that 
dr>fendants' demnn-er was improperly snstained. 
[14] Ppon an appeal from the final judgment, this ronrt 
Ct.E:~mxTs Y. T. R BECHTEL Co. [43 C.2cl 
may review any intermediate order or de-
eision, from whieh an appeal which in-
volves the merits or judgment (Code 
Civ. Proe., § 956; lfienzic:s v. Geophysical Inc., llG 
Cal.App.2d 419 [254 P.2d 51]). The trial eourt here granted 
defendants' motion to strike various portions of plaintiffs' 
complaint. The portions of the complaint so stricken were 
essential to plaintiffs' cause of action to foreclose the me-
chanic's lien and the motion should not have been 
I•'or example, all of Paragraph XI was, on motion, stricken. 
This paragraph, which has been heretofore commented upon, 
was a vital part of plaintiffs' cause of action inasmuch 
as it set forth in substance the ordinance upon which plain-
tiffs relied to show that the county surveyor had not in-
speeted, or accepted, the work done by plaintiffs so as to 
bring them within that portion of section 1191, subdivision 
(Code of Civil Proeeclure), providing that the elate of eomple-
tion-the time the period of limitation eommenced to run-was 
the date of sneh acceptance. Also stricken from the complaint 
were the allegations setting forth the statements eontained in 
the claim of lien as filed with the County Recorder which 
were required by seetion 1187 of the Code of Civil Proeedure. 
[15] While a motion to strike is addressed to the sound dis-
eretion of the trial court (Code Civ. Proc., § 452; Colden v. 
Broa.dway State Bank, 11 Cal.App.2d 428 [53 P.2d 983] ), a 
matter which is essential to a cause of action should not be 
strieken (Johnson v. Central Aviation Corp., 103 Cal.App.2d 
102, 105, 106 [229 P.2d ll4]) and it is error to do so (Menzies 
v. Geophysical Service, Inc. 116 Oal.App.2d 419, 422, 424 
[254 P.2d 51]; Allerton v. King, 96 Cal.App. 230, 234 [274 
P. 90]). 
Plaintiffs having stated a cause of action, it appears 
to us that the trial court erroneously granted defendants' 
motion to strike and that it was error to sustain defendants' 
demurrer to the complaint. Plaintiffs having stated a cause 
of action, it was not necessary for them to file an amended 
eomplaint. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Shenk, Acting C. J., Traynor, J., Schaner, J., Spence, J., 
and Bray, J. pro tern.,* concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-I concur in the conclusion that the county 
surveyor is a municipal officer within the meaning of section 
*Assigned by Chairman of ,Judicial Council. 
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subdivision , of the Code of Civil Procedure. The 
claim filed the plaintiffs therefore was not barred by lapse 
of time. 
in my opinion the special demurrer on the ground 
and properly was sustained, but 
the order should have allowed the claimants leave to amend. 
For these reasons, I concur in the of reversal. 
F. No. 190;)3. In Bank. July 9, 
In re VINCENT W. 111\LLI~A~ for Disbarment of Member 
of State Bar of California. 
Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Proceedings on Convic-
tion of Crime Involving Moral Turpitude.-An attorney whose 
disbarment is sought on ground of conviction of crime involv-
ing moral turpitude has not made required showing of dis-
crimination to sustain his contention that he is being denied 
equal protection of the laws, where he has not directly chal-
lenged by appeal or otherwise propriety of his conviction for 
violating Internal ReYenue Code, § 145, subd. (b), by willfully 
and knov;ingly filing false and fraudulent income tax returns, 
and where he has not shown that others demonstrably guilty of 
violating such section have not been prosecuted or that the 
section is administered discriminatorily against a class to which 
he belongs. 
[2] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-An attorney whose disbarment was sought 
on the ground that he had been convicted, after trial, of a 
crime involving moral turpitude was not entitled to claim dis-
crimination because the State Bar failed to proceed against 
other attorneys who had pleaded nolo contendere, and the 
State Bar was justified in treating· such plea as not being the 
equivalent of a plea or verdict of guilty within the meaning 
of Bus. & Prof. Cod<>, § 6101, prior to 1953 amendment. 
[3] !d.-Disciplinary Proceedings-Conviction of Crime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-A crime in which intent to defraud is essen-
tial element is a crime inYolving moral turpitude. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law,§ 117. 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 73 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Attorneys at Law, § 279 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 9-11, 14) Attorneys,§ 172..'5; [2-8, 12) 
Attorneys,§ 141; [13] Courts,§ 106; [15] Attorney,§ 172. 
